Allocating multiple goods to customers in a way that maximizes some desired objective is a fundamental part of Algorithmic Mechanism Design. We consider here the problem of offline and online allocation of goods that have economies of scale, or decreasing marginal cost per item for the seller. In particular, we analyze the case where customers have unit-demand and arrive one at a time with valuations on items, sampled iid from some unknown underlying distribution over valuations. Our strategy operates by using an initial sample to learn enough about the distribution to determine how best to allocate to future customers, together with an analysis of structural properties of optimal solutions that allow for uniform convergence analysis. We show, for instance, if customers have {0, 1} valuations over items, and the goal of the allocator is to give each customer an item he or she values, we can efficiently produce such an allocation with cost at most a constant factor greater than the minimum over such allocations in hindsight, so long as the marginal costs do not decrease too rapidly. We also give a bicriteria approximation to social welfare for the case of more general valuation functions when the allocator is budget constrained.
Introduction
Imagine it is the Christmas season, and Santa Claus is tasked with allocating toys. There is a sequence of children coming up with their Christmas lists of toys they want. Santa wants to give each child some toy from his or her list (all children have been good this year). But of course, even Santa Claus has to be cost-conscious, so he wants to perform this allocation of toys to children at a near-minimum cost to himself (call this the Thrifty Santa Problem). Now if it was the case that every toy had a fixed price, this would be easy: simply allocate to each child the cheapest toy on his or her list and move on to the next child. But here we are interested in the case where goods have economies of scale. For example, producing a millon toy cars might be cheaper than a million times the cost of producing one toy car. Thus, even if producing a single toy car is more expensive than a single Elmo doll, if a much larger number of children want the toy car than the Elmo doll, the minimum-cost allocation might give toy cars to many children, even if some of them also have the Elmo doll on their lists.
The problem faced by Santa (or by any allocator that must satisfy a collection of disjunctive constraints in the presence of economies of scale) makes sense in both offline and online settings. In the offline setting, in the extreme case of goods such as software where all the cost is in the first copy, this is simply weighted generate allocations for the remaining valuations. As long as the marginal costs are not decreasing too rapidly, we can obtain an allocation strategy for which the sum of valuations of the allocated items will be within a constant factor of the maximum possible, minus a small additive term, subject to the budget constraint on the cost.
Our Results and Techniques
We consider this problem under two, related, natural objectives. In the first (the "thrifty Santa" objective) we assume customers have binary {0, 1} valuations, and the goal of the seller is to give each customer a toy of value 1, but in such a way that minimizes the total cost to the seller. We show that so long as the number of buyers n is large compared to the number of items r, and so long as the marginal costs do not decrease too rapidly (e.g., a rate 1/t α for some 0 ≤ α < 1), we can efficiently perform this allocation task with cost at most a constant factor greater than that of the optimal allocation of items in hindsight. Note that if costs decrease much more rapidly, then even if all customers' valuations were known up front, we would be faced with (roughly) a set-cover problem and so one could not hope to achieve cost o(log n) times optimal. The second objective we consider, which we apply to customers of arbitrary unit-demand valuation, is that of maximizing total social welfare of customers subject to a cost bound on the seller; for this, we also give a strategy that is constant-competitive with respect to the optimal allocation in hindsight.
Our algorithms operate by using initial buyers to learn enough about the distribution to determine how best to allocate to the future buyers. In fact, there are two main technical parts of our work: the sample complexity and the algorithmic aspects. From the perspective of sample complexity, one key component of this analysis is examining how complicated the allocation rule needs to be in order to achieve good performance, because simpler allocation rules require fewer samples in order to learn. We do this by providing a characterization of what the optimal strategies look like. For example, for the thrifty Santa Claus version, we show that the optimal solution can be assumed wlog to have a simple permutation structure. In particular, so long as the marginal costs are nonincreasing, there is always an optimal strategy in hindsight of this form: order the items according to some permutation and for each bidder, give it the earliest item of its desire in the permutation. This characterization is used inside both our sample complexity results and our algorithmic guarantees. Specifically, we prove that for cost function cost(t) = t τ =1 1/τ α , for α ∈ [0, 1), running greedy weighted set cover incurs total cost at most 1 1−α OPT. More generally, if the average cost is within some factor of the marginal cost, we have a greedy algorithm that achieves constant approximation ratio. To allocate to new buyers, we simply give it the earliest item of its desire in the learnt permutation. For the case of general valuations, we give a characterization showing that the optimal allocation rule in terms of social welfare can be described by a pricing scheme. That is, there exists a pricing scheme such that if buyers purchased their preferred item at these prices, the optimal allocation would result. Algorithmically, we show that we can reduce to a weighted budgeted maximum coverage problem with single-parameter demand for which there is a known constant-approximation-ratio algorithm [8] .
Related Work
In this work we focus on the case of decreasing marginal cost. There have been a large body of research devoted to unlimited supply, which is implicitly constant marginal cost (e.g., [10] Chapter 13), where the goal is to achieve a constant competitive ratio in both offline and online models. The case of increasing marginal cost was studied in [2] where constant competitive ratio was given.
We analyze an online setting where buyers arrive one at a time, sampled iid from some unknown underlying distribution over valuations. Other related online problems with stochastic inputs such as matching problems have been studied in ad auctions [5, 9] . Algorithmically, our work is related to the online set cover body of work where [1] gave the first O(log m log n) competitive algorithm (here n is the number of elements in the ground set and m is size of a family of subsets of the ground set). The problems we study are also related to online matching problems [3, 4, 7] in the iid setting; however our problem is more like the "opposite" of online matching in that the cumulative cost curve for us is concave rather than convex.
Model, Definitions, and Notation
We have a set I of r items. We have a set N = {1, . . . , n} indexing n unit demand buyers. Our setting can then generally be formalized in the following terms.
Utility Functions
Each buyer j ∈ N has a weight u j,i for each item i ∈ I. We suppose the vectors u j,· are sampled i.i.d. according to a fixed (but arbitrary and unknown) distribution. In the online setting we are interested in, the buyers' weight vectors u j,· are observed in sequence, and for each one (before observing the next) we are required to allocate a set of items T j ⊆ I to that buyer. The utility of buyer j for this allocation is then defined as u j (T j ) = max i∈T j u j,i . A few of our results consider a slight variant of this model, in which we are only required to begin allocating goods after some initial o(n) number of customers has been observed (to whom we may allocate items retroactively).
This general setting is referred to as the weighted unit demand setting. We will also be interested in certain special cases of this problem. In particular, many of our results are for the uniform unit demand setting, in which every j ∈ N and i ∈ I have u j,i ∈ {0, 1}. In this case, we may refer to the set S j = {i ∈ I : u j,i = 1} as the list of items buyer j wants (one of).
Production cost
We suppose there are cumulative cost functions cost i : N → [0, ∞] for each item i ∈ I, where for t ∈ N, the value of cost i (t) represents the cost of producing t copies of item i. We suppose each cost i (·) is nondecreasing.
We would like to consider the case of decreasing marginal cost, where t → cost i (t + 1) − cost i (t) is nonincreasing for each i ∈ I.
A natural class of decreasing marginal costs we will be especially interested in are of the form t −α for α ∈ [0, 1). That is, cost i (t) = c 0 t τ =1 τ −α .
Allocation problems
After processing the n buyers, we will have allocated some set of items T , consisting of m i (T ) = j∈N I T j (i) copies of each item i ∈ I. We are then interested in two quantities in this setting: the total (production) cost cost(T ) = i∈I cost i (m i (T )) and the social welfare SW (T ) = j∈N u j (T j ).
We are interested in several different objectives within this setting, each of which is some variant representing the trade-off between reducing total production cost while increasing social welfare.
In the allocate all problem, we have to allocate to each buyer j ∈ N one item i ∈ S j (in the uniform demand setting): that is, SW (T ) = n. The goal is to minimize the total cost cost(T ), subject to this constraint.
The allocate with budget problem requires our total cost to never exceed a given limit b (i.e., cost(T ) ≤ b). Subject to this constraint, our objective is to maximize the social welfare SW (T ). For instance, in the uniform demand setting, this corresponds to maximizing the number of satisfied buyers (that get an item from their set S j ).
The objective in the maximize social surplus problem is to maximize the difference of the social welfare and the total cost (i.e., SW (T ) − cost(T )).
Structural Results and Allocation Policies
We now present several results about the structure of optimal (and non-optimal but "reasonable") solutions to allocation problems in the setting of decreasing marginal costs. These will be important in our samplecomplexity analysis because they allow us to focus on allocation policies that have inherent complexity that depends only on the number of items and not on the number of customers, allowing for the use of uniform convergence bounds. That is, a small random sample of customers will be sufficient to uniformly estimate the performance of these policies over the full set of customers.
Permutation and pricing policies
A permutation policy has a permutation π over I and is applicable in the case of uniform unit demand. Given buyer j arriving, we allocate to him the minimal (first) demanded item in the permutation, i.e., arg min i∈S j π(i). A pricing policy assigns a price price i to each item i and is applicable to general quasilinear utility functions. Given buyer j arriving, we allocate to him whatever he wishes to purchase at those prices, i.e., arg max T j u j (T j ) − i∈T j price i . 1 We will see below that for uniform unit demand buyers, there always exists a permutation policy that is optimal for the allocate-all task, and for general quasilinear utilities there always exists a pricing policy that is optimal for the task of maximizing social surplus. We will also see that for weighted unit demand buyers, there always exists a pricing policy that is optimal for the allocate-with-budget task; moreover, for any even non-optimal solution (e.g., that might be produced by a polynomial-time algorithm) there exists a pricing policy that sells the same number of copies each item and has social welfare at least as high (and can be computed in polynomial time given the initial solution).
Structural results
Theorem 3.1. For general quasilinear utilities, any allocation that maximizes social surplus can be produced by a pricing policy. That is, if T = {T 1 , . . . , T n } is an allocation maximizing SW (T ) − cost(T ) then there exist prices price 1 , . . . , price r such that buyers purchasing their most-demanded bundle recovers T , assuming that the marginal cost function is strictly decreasing. 2 Proof. Consider the optimal allocation OPT. Define price i to be the marginal cost of the next copy of item i under OPT, i.e., price i = cost i (# i (OPT) + 1). Suppose some buyer j is assigned set T j in OPT but prefers set T j under these prices. Then,
Now, consider modifying OPT by replacing T j with T j . This increases buyer j's utility by u j (T j ) − u j (T j ), incurs an extra purchase cost exactly i∈T j \T j price i and a savings of strictly more than i∈T j \T j price i (because marginal costs are decreasing). Thus, by (1) this would be a strictly preferable allocation, contradicting the optimality of OPT.
Corollary 3.2. For uniform unit demand buyers there exists an optimal allocation that is a permutation policy, for the allocate all task.
Proof. Imagine each buyer j had valuation v max on items in S j where v max is greater than the maximum cost of any single item. The allocation OPT that maximizes social surplus would then minimize cost subject to allocating exactly one item to each buyer and therefore would be optimal for the allocate-all task. Consider the pricing associated to this allocation given by Theorem 3.1. Since each buyer j is uniform unit demand, he will simply purchase the cheapest item in S j . Therefore, the permutation π that orders items according to increasing price according to the prices of Theorem 3.1 will produce the same allocation.
We now present a structural statement that will be useful for the allocate-with-budget task. Theorem 3.3. For weighted unit-demand buyers, for any allocation T there exists a pricing policy that allocates the same multiset of items T (or a subset of T ) and has social welfare at least as large as T . Moreover, this pricing can be computed efficiently from T and the buyers' valuations.
Proof. Let T be the multiset of items allocated by T . Weighted unit-demand valuations satisfy the grosssubstitutes property, so by the Second Welfare Theorem (e.g., see [10] Theorem 11.15) there exists a Walrasian equilibrium: a set of prices for the items in T that clears the market. Moreover, these prices can be computed efficiently from demand queries (e.g., [10] , Theorem 11.24), which can be evaluated efficiently for weighted unit-demand buyers. Furthermore, these prices must assign all copies of the same item in T the same price (else the pricing would not be an equilibrium) so it corresponds to a legal pricing policy. Thus, we have a legal pricing such that if all buyers were shown only the items represented in T , at these prices, then the market would clear perfectly (breaking any ties in our favor). We can address the fact that there may be items not represented in T (i.e., they had zero copies sold) by simply setting their price to infinity. Finally, by the First Welfare Theorem (e.g., [10] Theorem 11.13), this pricing maximizes social welfare over all allocations of T , and therefore achieves social welfare at least as large as T , as desired.
The above structural results will allow us to use the following sketch of an online algorithm. First sample an initial set of buyers. Then, for the allocate-all problem, compute the best (or approximately best) permutation policy according to the empirical frequencies given by the sample. Or, for the allocate-with budget task, compute the best (or approximately best) allocation according to these empirical frequencies and convert it into a pricing policy. Then run this permutation or pricing policy on the remainder of the customers. Finally, using the fact that these policies have low complexity (they are lists or vectors in a space that depends only on the number of items and not on the number of buyers) compute the size of initial sample needed to ensure that the estimated performance is close to true performance uniformly over all policies in the class.
Uniform Unit Demand and the Allocate-All problem
Here we consider the allocate-all problem for the setting of uniform unit demand. We begin by considering the following natural class of decreasing marginal cost curves such as 1/ √ t.
Definition 4.1. We say the cost function cost(t) is α-poly if the marginal cost of item t is 1/t α for α ∈ [0, 1).
If each cost function is α-poly, then there exists an efficient offline algorithm that given a set X of buyers produces a permutation policy that incurs total cost at most
Proof. We run the greedy set-cover algorithm. Specifically, we choose the item desired by the most buyers and put it at the top of the permutation π. We then choose the item desired by the most buyers who did not receive the first item and put it next, and so on. For notational convenience assume π is the identity, and let B i denote the set of buyers that receive item i, For any set B ⊆ X, let OPT(B) denote the cost of the optimal solution to the subproblem B (i.e., the problem in which we are only required to cover buyers in
since any solution using more than one set to cover the elements of B r has at least as large a cost. Now, for the purpose of induction, suppose that some k ∈ {2, . . . , r} has OPT( r t=k B t ) ≥ r t=k |B t | 1−α . Then, since B k−1 was chosen to be the largest subset of r t=k−1 B t that can be covered by a single item, it must be that the sets used by any allocation for the This implies OPT(
By the inductive hypothesis, this latter expression is at least as large as More general cost curves We can generalize the above result to a broader class of smoothly decreasing cost curves. Define the average cost of item i given to set B i of buyers as AvgC(i,
Here is a greedy algorithm.
Call GreedyGeneralCost(B − B i )
We make the following assumption:
For example, for the case of an α-poly cost, we have: M arC(t) = Theorem 4.4. The algorithm GreedyGeneralCost achieves approximation ratio β.
Proof. Order the elements in the order that GreedyGeneralCost allocates them. Let N i be the set of consumers that receive item i, and N = ∪N i in GreedyGeneralCost. For consumer j let item opt (j) be the item that OP T allocates to consumer j. Let opt (i) be the number of consumers that are allocated item i. By Assumption 4.3 we have M arC(i, l) ≤ AvgC(i, l) ≤ βM arC(i, l) (the first inequality is due to having decreasing marginal cost).
We would like to consider the influence of the consumers in N 1 on the cost of OP T . Let
The first inequality follows since taking the final marginal cost can only reduce the cost (decreasing marginal cost). The second inequality follows from Assumption 4.3. The third inequality follows since GreedyGeneralCost selects the lowest average cost of any allocated item .
We can now continue inductively.
We can show similarly that,
Summing over all j we have
Additionally, a property of β-nice cost functions we will need to use later is the following.
Proof. By the fact that marginal costs are non-negative, AvgC(2 x) ≥ cost i ( x)/(2 x). Therefore, by Assumption 4.3, M arC(2 x) ≥ cost i ( x)/(2 xβ). By the decreasing marginal cost property, we have
Applying this argument log 2 (1/ ) times, we have
Multiplying both sides by
) completes the proof.
Generalization Result
Say n is the total number of customers; is the size of subsample we do our estimate on; r is the total number of items; α ∈ (0, 1] is some constant, and the cost is α-poly, so that cost(t) = t τ =1 1/τ α t 1−α 1−α . We now show the following uniform convergence over permutation policies, which will justify the use of a near optimal policy for a sample on the larger population; the formal proof of this result is included in Appendix C. Theorem 4.6. Suppose n ≥ and the cost function is α-poly. With probability at least 1 − δ ( ) , for all permutations Π,
. Equivalently, for any given δ, this occurs with probability 1 − δ so long as
Proof. See Appendix C.
Online Performance Guarantees
We define GreedyGeneralCost( , n) as follows. For the first customers it allocates arbitrary items they desire, and observed their desired sets. Give the sets of the first customers, it runs GreedyGeneralCost and computes a permutationΠ of the items. For the remaining customers it allocates using permutationΠ. Namely, each customer is allocated the first item in the permutationΠ that is in its desired set. The following theorem bounds the performance of GreedyGeneralCost( , n) for α-poly cost functions; the formal proof of this result is included in Appendix C.
Theorem 4.7. With probability 1 − δ ( ) (for δ ( ) as in Theorem 4.6) The cost of GreedyGeneralCost( , n) is at most 
Generalization for β-nice costs
We now consider the case of β-nice costs in the online setting. We begin with a helper lemma.
Lemma 4.9. For any cost cost satisfying Assumption 4.3 with a given β, for any k ≥ 1, the cost cost with cost i (x) = cost i (kx) also satisfies Assumption 4.3 with the same β.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now the strategy is to run GreedyGeneralCost with the rescaled cost function cost i (x) = cost i ( n x). This provides a β-approximation guarantee for the rescaled problem, which, moreover is a permutation policy. The following shows we have uniform convergence of estimates to true costs for permutation policies. 
. With probability at least 1 − δ ( ) , for any permutations Π,
(1 + ) 2 1 − ,
Using the above uniform convergence result, we find that if we run GreedyGeneralCost on the sample of = o(n) initial buyers and apply it to the entire population, we achieve near optimal cost. Theorem 4.11. If cost satisfies Assumption 4.3, and has cost j (1) ∈ [1, B] for every j ≤ r, with probability at least 1 − δ, the cost of applying the policy found by GreedyGeneralCost({1, . . . , }) to all n customers is at most
Proof. By Theorem 4.4, Lemma 4.9, and Theorem 4.10, with probability at least 1 − δ, the cost of applying the policyΠ found by GreedyGeneralCost({1, . . . , }) to customers 1, . . . , n is at most
Note that Theorem 4.11 assumes the initial = o(n) buyers can be "previewed" before allocations are made and need not themselves be allocated online.
General Unit Demand Utilities
In this section we show how to give a constant approximation for the case of general unit demand buyers in the offline setting in the case when we have a budget B to bound the cost we incur and we would like to maximize the buyers social welfare given this budget constraint. The main tool would be a reduction of our problem to the budgeted maximum coverage problem.
Definition 5.1. An instance of the budgeted maximum coverage problem has a universe X of m elements where each x i ∈ X has an associated weight w i ; there is a collection of m sets B such that each sets S j ∈ B has a cost c j ; and there is a budget L. A feasible solution is a collection of sets B ⊂ B such that
The goal is to maximize the weight of the elements in B , i.e., w(B ) = x i ∈∪ S∈B S w i .
While the budgeted maximum coverage problem is NP-complete there is a (1 − 1/e) approximation algorithm [8] . Their algorithm is a variation of the greedy algorithm, where on the one hand it computes the greedy allocation, where each time a set which maximizes the ratio between weight of the elements covered and the cost of the set is added, as long as the budget constraint is not violated. On the other hand the single best set is computed. The output is the best of the two alternative (either the single best set of the greedy allocation).
Before we show the reduction from a general unit demand utility to the budgeted maximum coverage problem, we show a simpler case where for each buyer j has a value v j such that of any item i either v j = u j,i or u j,i = 0, which we call buyer-uniform unit demand.
Lemma 5.2. There is a reduction from the budgeted buyer-uniform unit demand buyers problem to the budgeted maximum coverage problem. In addition the greedy algorithm can be computed in polynomial time on the resulting instance.
Proof. For each buyer j we create an element x j with weight v j . For each item k and any subsets of buyers S we create a set T S,k = {x j : j ∈ S} and has cost cost k (|S|). The budget is set to be L = B. Clearly any feasible allocation of the budgeted maximum coverage problem T S 1 ,k 1 , . . . T Sr,kr can be translated to a solution of the budgeted buyer-uniform unit demand buyers by simply producing item k i for all the buyers in T S i ,k i . The welfare is the sum of the weight of the elements covered which is the social welfare, and the cost is exactly the production cost.
Note that the reduction generates an exponential number of sets, if we do it explicitly. However,we can run the Greedy algorithm easily, without generating the sets explicitly.
which have the highest ratio and adding this set still satisfies the budget constraint. Note that given that greedy selects T S,k where |S| = then its cost is cost k ( ) and its weigh is w(T S,k ) ≤ gain k ( ), and hence Greedy will always select one of the sets we are considering.
In the above reduction we used very heavily the fact that each buyer j has a single valuation v j regardless of which desired item it gets. In the following we show a slightly more involved reduction which handles the general unit demand buyers.
Lemma 5.3. There is a reduction from the budgeted general unit demand buyers problem to the budgeted maximum coverage problem. In addition the greedy algorithm can be computed in polynomial time on the resulting instance.
Proof. For each buyer j we sort its valuations u j,i 1 ≤ · · · ≤ u j,im . We set v j,i 1 = u j,i 1 and v j,ir = u j,ir − u j,i r−1 . Note that r s=1 v j,is = u j,ir . For each buyer j we create m elements x j,r , 1 ≤ r ≤ m. For a buyer j and item k let X j,k be all the elements that represent lower valuation than u j,k , i.e., X j,k = {x j,r : u j,ir ≤ u j,k }. For each item k and any subsets of buyers S we create a set T S,k = ∪ j∈S X j,k and has cost cost k (|S|). The budget is set to be L = B.
Any feasible allocation of the budgeted maximum coverage problem T S 1 ,k 1 , . . . T S l ,kr can be translated to a solution of the budgeted general unit demand buyers producing item k i for all the buyers in T S i ,k i . We call buyer j as winner if there exists some b such that x j,b ∈ ∪ r i=1 T S i ,k i . Let W inners we the set of all winner buyers. For any winner buyer j ∈ W inner let item(j) = s such that s = max{b :
The cost of our allocation is by definition at most L = B. The social welfare is
Again, note that the reduction generates an exponential number of sets, if we do it explicitly. However, we can run the Greedy algorithm easily, without generating the sets explicitly. For each item i and any ∈ [1, m] we compute the cost cost i ( )/gain i ( ), where gain i ( ) is the weight of the buyers with highest valuation for item i. Greedy selects the item i and number of buyers which have the highest ratio which still satisfies the budget constraint. Note that given that greedy selects T S,k where |S| = then its production cost is cost k ( ) and its weight is w(T S,k ) ≤ gain k ( ), and hence Greedy will always select one of the sets we are considering. Once the Greedy selects a set T S,k we need to update the utility of any buyer j ∈ S for any other item i, by setting u j,i = max{u j,i − u j,k , 0}, which is the residual valuation buyer j has for getting item i in addition to item k.
Combining our reduction with approximation algorithm of [8] we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4. There exists a poly-time algorithm for the budgeted general unit demand buyers problem which achieves social welfare at least (1 − 1/e)OPT.
Generalization
To extend these results to the online setting, we will use Theorem 3.3 to represent allocations by pricing policies, and then use the results from above to learn a good pricing policy based on an initial sample.
Theorem 5.5. Suppose every u j,i ∈ [0, C]. With = O((1/ 2 )(r 3 log(rC/ )+log(1/δ))) random samples, with probability at least 1 − δ, the empirical per-customer social welfare is within ± of the expected percustomer social welfare, uniformly over all price vectors in [0, C] r .
Proof. We will show that, for any distribution P and value > 0, there exist N = 2 O(r 3 log(rC/ )) functions f 1 , . . . , f N such that, for every price vector price ∈ [0, C] r , the function g(x) = x arg max i≤r x i −price i has min k≤N |f k − g|dP ≤ . This value N is known as the uniform -covering number. The result then follows from standard uniform convergence bounds (see e.g., [6] ).
First, note that if we suppose the valuations and price vectors are augmented by one dimension, setting price r+1 = u j,r+1 = 0 for all price vectors and all customers j, then we can represent the per-customer social welfare as x → sw(x; price) = x arg max i (x i −price i ) .
The function x → x i − price i is a hyperplane with slope 1 in coordinate i and slope 0 in all other coordinates. So the subgraph (i.e., the set of (r + 2)-dimensional points (x, y) for which max i≤r+1 x i − price i ≥ y is a union of r halfspaces in r + 2 dimensions. The space of unions of r + 1 halfspaces in r + 2 dimensions has VC dimension (r + 1)(r + 3), so this upper bounds the pseudo-dimension of the space of functions max i≤r+1 x i − price i , parametrized by the price vector price. Therefore, the uniform -covering number of this class is 2 O(r 2 log(C/ )) .
For each i ≤ r +1, the set of vectors x ∈ [0, C] r+1 such that i = arg max k x k −price k is an intersection of r + 1 halfspaces in r + 1 dimensions. Thus, the function x → price arg max i x i −price i is contained in the family of linear combinations of r + 1 disjoint intersections of r + 1 halfspaces. The VC dimension of an intersection of r + 1 halfspaces in r + 1 dimensions is (r + 1)(r + 2). So assuming the prices are bounded in a range [0, C], the uniform -covering number for linear combinations (with weights in [0, C]) of r + 1 disjoint intersections of r + 1 halfspaces is 2 O(r 3 log(rC/ )) . To prove this, we can take an /(2(r + 1)C) cover (of {0, 1}-valued functions) of intersections of r + 1 halfspaces, which has size ((r + 1)C/ ) O(r 2 ) , and then take an /(2(r + 1)) grid in [0, C] and multiply each function in the cover by each of these values to get a space of real-valued functions; there are ((r + 1)C/ ) O(r 2 ) total functions in this cover, and for each term in the linear combination of r + 1 disjoint intersections of r + 1 halfspaces, at least one of these real-valued functions will be within /(r + 1) of it. Thus, taking the set of sums of r + 1 functions from this cover forms an -cover of the space of linear combinations of r + 1 disjoint intersections of r + 1 halfspaces, with size ((r + 1)C/ ) O(r 3 ) . Now note that x arg max i (x i −price i ) = max i (x i − price i ) + price arg max i (x i −price i ) . So the uniformcovering number for the space of possible functions x arg max i (x i −price i ) is at most the product of the uniform ( /2)-covering number for the space of functions x → max i (x i − price i ) and the uniform ( /2)-covering number for the space of functions x → price arg max i (x i −price i ) ; by the above, this product is 2 O(r 3 log(rC/ )) .
We also make use of the following result.
Theorem 5.6. With ≥ O((1/ 2 )(r 2 + log(1/δ))) random samples, with probability at least 1 − δ, the empirical probability of a customer buying item j is within ± of the actual probability, uniformly over all price vectors and all j.
Proof. For a given price vector, the region of customers j purchasing item i is delineated by at most r hyperplanes (corresponding to i tying with another index for maximizing u j,i −price i , or else u j,i −price i = 0 and all the other indices make it at most 0). Thus it is an intersection of r hyperplanes in r dimensions. The VC dimension of this is class is r(r + 1), so the VC dimension of the collection of sets of customers buying item i as we vary price is at most r(r + 1). So by the standard uniform convergence results for convergence of frequencies to probabilities, O((1/ 2 )(r 2 + log(r/δ)) samples suffice so that the empirical probability of getting a customer that buys item i is within ± of the actual probability, uniformly over all price vectors, with probability at least 1 − δ/r. A union bound implies this holds simultaneously for all i with probability at least 1 − δ. Noting that (1/ 2 )(r 2 + log(r/δ)) = O((1/ 2 )(r 2 + log(1/δ))) completes the proof.
Consider an algorithm that does not allocate anything to the first = O((C 2 / 2 )(r 3 log(rC/ ) + log(1/δ))) customers, then finds a (1 − 1/e)-approximate solution to the offline budgeted general unit demand problem on these customers, with budget B, and cost functions cost i (x) = cost i (x · ((n − )/ )), via the reduction to the budgeted maximum coverage problem. The algorithm then finds a pricing policy price providing at least as good of a social welfare on these customers, within this budget B. Let i denote the number of copies of item i this pricing policy allocates among the customers. The algorithm then proceeds to allocate to the remaining stream of n − customers using this pricing policy, but if at any time the item i this pricing policy determines should be allocated to the next customer has already had i ((n − )/ ) copies allocated to customers in the past, then the algorithm does not allocate any item to that customer and simply moves on to the next customer. (As stated, this is not incentive-compatible: we are assuming that if a buyer enters the store and finds his most-desired item is sold-out, he just leaves rather than buying some other item; however, we rectify this in Corollary 5.8 below.) We have the following result on the performance of this algorithm.
Theorem 5.7. The allocation given by the above algorithm does not exceed the budget B, and if n ≥ O((1/ ) ), with probability at least 1 − 4δ, achieves a social welfare at least
Proof. See Appendix D.
To make the above procedure incentive-compatible, if at any time the pricing policy attempts to allocate more than i ((n − )/ ) copies of item i, then for that customer j we can just allocate the item i that has the next-highest u j,i −price i among those i for which the number of copies of item i this policy has attempted to allocate previously is less than i ((n − )/ ) (or nothing, if all remaining i have u j,i − price i < 0). A simple modification of the above proof yields the following result on the performance of this algorithm.
Corollary 5.8. The allocation given by the above algorithm does not exceed the budget B, and if n ≥ O((1/ ) ), with probability at least 1 − 4δ, the allocation achieves a social welfare at least
Proof Sketch. The full details of this proof are provided in Appendix D; here, we present a brief sketch. As above, on the (1 − 4δ)-probability event of Theorem 5.7, we also have that for each i, n i ≤ i n− + 2 (n − ) ≤ i n− + 2 n. Let us now define T i to be the time at which item i runs out; i.e., the index of the buyer who purchases copy i n− of that item (or ∞ if the item never runs out) and wlog assume T 1 ≤ T 2 ≤ · · · ≤ T r . We now argue that there are at most 2 n(i − 1) buyers who were given item i in the procedure of Theorem 5.7 but receive some different item now. Specifically, consider one such buyer. The copy of item i that this buyer originally received must have been purchased by some other buyer whose preferred item was some i ≤ i (because items of index greater than i still remain). This buyer, under the procedure of Theorem 5.7 either received item i or nothing. If it received item i we continue back up the chain, examining the buyer who took that copy of item i and must have a preferred item i ≤ i , and so on until we reach a buyer who received nothing under the procedure of Theorem 5.7. Because each buyer only purchases one item, these chains cannot merge, and so the total number of buyers who were given item i in the procedure of Theorem 5.7 but receive some different item now, is at most the number of possible endpoints of such chains, which is 2 n(i − 1). Summing this over all r items yields the claimed bound.
A Properties of β-nice cost
Let cost(n) be a β-nice cost function. We show a few properties of it.
Proof.
Also, the property of nonincreasing marginal costs implies ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , k},
Therefore,
Claim A.1.
Proof. Let a = cost(n)/n be the average cost of the first n items. Then the cost of the first 2n items is at least an, and has an average cost of at least a/2. The marginal cost of item 2n is at least a/(2β). Therefore the cost of the items n + 1 to 2n is at least an/(2β).
We can get a better bound by a more refine analysis.
Claim A.2. Let a n = cost(n)/n be the average cost of the first n items. Then, a n+1 ≥ a n n n + 1 1 + 1 β(n + 1) and a n ≥ a 1 1 n
Proof. The marginal cost of item n + 1 is at least a n /β. Therefore the cost of the first items n + 1 is at least na n + a n /(β), which gives the first expression.
We get the expression of a n as a function of a 1 by repeatedly using the recursion. The approximation follows from,
where we used the identity x − x 2 ≤ ln(1 + x).
B Additional Proofs
Theorem 4.10. Suppose n ≥ and the cost function satisfies Assumption 4.3, and that ∀i,
Proof. Fix a permutation Π. Let π j denote the event that a customer buys item Π j and not covered by items Π 1 through Π j−1 . Namely, the probability that the consumer set of desired items include j and none of the items 1, . . . , j − 1. Let q j denote P r[π j ], and letq j denote the fraction of Π j on the initial -sample. Let q * = rB(1+ ) n c−1 , where c = log 2 (1 + 1 2β ). Item j is a "Low probability item" if q j < q * , and is called a "High probability item" if q j ≥ q * . Let the set "Low" include all "Low probability items"; and the set "High" include all "High probability items".
First we address the case of item j of low probability. By a Chernoff bound, the quantity of item j that we will sell when applying Π to n customers is at most q * n(1 + ), with probability at least 1 − exp{− 2 q * n/3} = 1 − δ 1 . By a union bound, this holds for all low probability items j with probability at least 1 − |Low|δ 1 .
Next, suppose j has high probability. In this case, the quantity of item j we will sell when applying Π to n customers is at most q j n(1 + ), with probability at least 1 − exp{− 2 q j n/3} ≥ 1 − δ 1 . Again, a union bound implies this holds for all high probability j with probability at least 1 − |High|δ 1 .
We have that (by Chernoff bounds), with probability at least 1 − exp{− 2 q j /3} ≥ 1 − δ 2 , we have q j /q j ≤ (1 + ). A union bound implies this holds for all high probability j with probability 1 − rδ 2 .
Furthermore, noting that q j n(1 + ) =q j n(1 + )
, and upper bounding q ĵ q j by 1 + , we get that q j n(1 + ) ≤ (1 + ) 2q j n, with probability at least 1 − δ 2 . Thus, with probability at least 1
Note that Lemma 4.5 (with = 1/x) implies that on n customers,
where the third inequality is by the assumption on the range of cost i (1). Thus, rBq * n(1 + ) = n c ≤ OPT.
We showed that
The lower bound is basically similar. For j ∈ Low, a Chernoff bound implies we haveq j < q * (1 + ) with probability at least 1 − exp{− 2 q * /3} ≥ 1 − δ 2 . So we have
For j ∈ High, again by a Chernoff bound, we haveq j /q j ≤ (1 + ) with probability at least 1 − exp{− 2 q j /3} ≥ 1 − δ 2 . Thus, by a union bound, with probability at least 1 − rδ 2 ,
By another application of Chernoff and union bounds, with probability at least 1− j∈High exp{− 2 q j n/2} ≥ 1−rδ 1 , for every j ∈ High, the number of j we will sell when applying Π to n customers is at least q i n(1− ). Thus,
Altogether, we have proven that with probability at least 1 − r(δ 1 + δ 2 ),
A naive union bound can be done over all the permutations, which will add a factor of r!; we can reduce the factor to r2 r by noticing that we are only interested in events of the type π j , namely a given item (say, j) is in the set of desired items, and another set (say, {1, . . . , j − 1}) is not in that set. This has only r2 r different events we need to perform the union over. Thus, the above inequalities hold for all permutations with probability at least 1 − r 2 2 r+1 (δ 1 + δ 2 ).
C Proofs of Theorems 4.6 and 4.7
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Fix a permutation Π. Let π j denote the event that a customer buys item Π j and not covered by items Π 1 through Π j−1 . Namely, the probability that the consumer set of desired items include j and none of the items 1, . . . , j − 1. Let q j denote P r[π j ], and letq j denote the fraction of Π j on the initial -sample.
Item j to is a "Low probability item" if q j < r 1 1−α ; and "High probability items" if q j ≥ r 1 1−α . Let the set "Low" include all "Low probability items"; and the set "High" include all "High probability items".
First we address the case of item j of low probability. The quantity of item j that we will sell is at most r 1 1−α n(1 + ) (Chernoff bound) with probability at least 1 − δ 1 with δ 1 = exp{− 2 r 1 1−α n/3}. By a union bound, this holds for all low probability item j, with probability at least 1 − |Low|δ 1 .
Next, we suppose j has high probability. In this case, the quantity of item j we will sell is at most q j n(1 + ), with probability at least 1 − exp{− 2 q j n/3} ≥ 1 − δ 1 . Again, a union bound implies this holds for all high probability j with probability at least 1 − |High|δ 1 .
, and upper bounding q ĵ q j by 1 + , we get that q j n(1 + ) ≤ (1 + ) 2q j n, with probability 1 − δ 2 . Thus, cost(Π, n) ≤ cost(Low) + cost(High)
Note that the total cost of all low probability items is at most -fraction of OPT which is at least
by definition of cost(Π, ). Therefore we showed,
The lower bound is basically similar. For j ∈ Low, we have q j < r 
with probability at least 1 − exp −q j n 2 /2 ≥ 1 − δ 3 . For low-probability j, the number of item j sold is ≥ r 1 1−α n(1 − ) with probability at least 1 − δ 3 . A union bound extends these to all j with combined probability 1 − rδ 3 .
Thus we obtain the upper bound: cost(Π, n) ≤ cost(Π, )(1 + ) 2(1−α) n 1−α and the lower bound: cost(Π, n) ≥ cost(Π, )(1 + ) −2 n 1−α , with probability at least 1 − r2 r (δ 1 + δ 2 + δ 3 ).
A naive union bound can be done over all the permutations, which will add a factor of r!, we can reduce the factor to r2 r by noticing that we are only interested in events of the type π j , namely a given item (say, j) is in the set of desired items, and another set (say, {1, . . . , j − 1}) is not in that set. This has only r2 r different events we need to perform the union over.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. LetΠ be the permutation policy produced by GreedyGeneralCost, after the first customers. By Theorem 4.4,
By Theorem 4.6, with probability 1 − δ ( ) ,
Additionally, on this same event,
Altogether, this implies
D Proof of Theorem 5.7 and Corollary 5.8
Proof of Theorem 5.7. By Theorem 5.6, with probability at least 1 − δ, both the price vector price produced by this method and the price vector price * corresponding to the OPT solution have, for every item i, the probabilities p i and p * i a random customer purchases item i given prices price adn price * , respectively, satisfy |p i − i / | ≤ and |p * i − * i / | ≤ , where * i is the number of customers among 1, . . . , that purchase item i given prices price * . Furthermore, letting n i and n * i denote the number of customers among + 1, . . . , n that would purchase item i given the price vectors price and price * , respectively, Theorem 5.6 also implies that, with probability at least 1−δ, every item i has |p i −n i /(n− )| ≤ and |p * i −n * i /(n− )| ≤ . Therefore, by a union bound, with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
Next, let sw(x, price) and sw(x, price * ) denote the per-customer social welfares for allocating to a customer with utility vector x using prices price and price * , respectively. Theorem 5.5 implies that with probability at least 1 − δ,
where x is sampled independently from the u j,· according to the same distribution. Furthermore, Theorem 5.5 also implies that with probability at least 1 − δ,
Therefore, by a union bound, with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
and
Now consider the allocation that allocates item i to the first n * i n− customers in 1, . . . , that would purchase item i given prices price * , and let SW * denote the social welfare achieved by this policy on these customers. Since the allocation induced by price * on the customers + 1, . . . , n satisfies the budget constraint, we know that the above allocation for customers 1, . . . , achieving social welfare SW * has total cost (under cost ) at most i cost i n * i n− = i cost i (n * i ) ≤ B, so that this allocation respects the budget on this -sized problem. In particular, this implies j=1 sw(u j,· , price)
Next, consider the allocation used by the algorithm above, which allocates each item i to the first i n− customers in + 1, . . . , n that would purchase item i given the prices price, and let SW denote the social welfare achieved by this policy on these customers. Since the allocation induced by price on the customers 1, . . . , satisfies the budget constraint under cost , we know that this allocation for customers + 1, . . . , n achieving social welfare SW has total cost (under cost) at most i cost i i n− = i cost i ( i ) ≤ B, so that this allocation respects the budget on this (n − )-sized problem. Also, by (2), we have ∀i, i n− ≥ n i − 2 (n − ), so that SW ≥ n j= +1 sw(u j,· , price) − 2 (n − )Cr. Furthermore, (4) implies n j= +1 sw(u j,· , price) ≥ n− j=1 sw(u j,· , price) − 2 (n − ). Together, we have
sw(u j,· , price) − 2 (n − ) − 2 (n − )Cr.
Combined with (6), this implies
sw(u j,· , price * ) − 2(2 − 1/e)(1 + Cr) (n − )
sw(u j,· , price * ) − 2(2 − 1/e)(1 + Cr) n.
The result then follows by a union bound (combining the two 1 − 2δ probability events) and the fact that sw(u j,· , price * ) ≥ OPT − C ≥ OPT − C n.
Proof of Corollary 5.8. As in the proof of Theorem 5.7, on the (1 − 4δ)-probability event of Theorem 5.7, we also have that for each i, n i ≤ i n− + 2 (n − ) ≤ i n− + 2 n. Therefore, the number of customers j for which i = arg max i u j,i − price i and u j,i − price i ≥ 0, which appear in the sequence of customers after the initial i n− such customers is at most 2 n.
For each t, let i t be the t th item i to reach a number of copies of item i allocated equal i n− . Consider the following notion of a "chain". Consider any given customer j for which there exists an item i = arg max i u j,i − price i with u j,i − price i ≥ 0, and yet the customer j is not allocated item i. Suppose customer j is the q th customer j in the sequence to have i = arg max i u j ,i −price i and u j ,i −price i ≥ 0. If q > i n− , then we define the "chain" rooted at customer j to be simply {j}. On the other hand, if q ≤ i n− , then denoting by q i the number of customers j in the sequence with i = arg max i u j ,i − price i and u j ,i − price i ≥ 0 who actually do receive a copy of item i in the allocation, and denote by j i,q the index of the (q − q ) th customer j to receive a copy of item i while i = arg max i u j ,i − price i ; there must exist such a value j i,q < j, since q ≤ i n− , but the number of copies of item i allocated has reached i n− prior to reaching customer j. Since j i,q < j, and customer j i,q did not receive item i = arg max i u j i,q ,i − price i even though u j i,q ,i − price i ≥ 0, we can inductively suppose there is a chain R rooted at customer j i,q . Then we define the chain rooted at customer j to be {j} ∪ R. Furthermore, note that i = i t for some t (since the number of copies of item i allocated reaches i n− prior to reaching customer j), and in the latter case above we must have that i = i t for some t < t, since customer j i,q did not receive item i (indicating its number of copies had reached i n− ), but did receive item i at that time). Therefore, by induction, each time we augment a chain in this way, we increase the largest value of t for which one of the customers j in the chain has i t = arg max i u j ,i − price i and u j ,i t − price i t ≥ 0; this implies that all chains have length at most r. Thus, we have inductively defined a notion of a "chain" for every customer j that does not receive the item that would be allocated by the pricing policy price.
Note that, since each customer j is allocated at most one item, we can have j = j i,q for at most one i and q in the above construction; this implies that, if R is the chain rooted at j , at most one customer j / ∈ R has {j} ∪ R as the chain rooted at j. Therefore, any two chains are either disjoint or one is a subset of the other. Furthermore, note that the union of the maximal chains (the chains R such that there are no customers j / ∈ R with {j} ∪ R as the chain rooted at j) contains every customer j that does not receive the item that would be allocated to j by the pricing policy price. Also, each chain contains some customer j for which the chain rooted at j is {j}, which means that for i = arg max i u j,i − price i , if j was the q th customer j to have i = arg max i u j ,i − price i and u j ,i − price i ≥ 0, where q > i n− . Since the number of such customers is at most i n i − i n− ≤ r(2 n + 1), and since any two maximal chains are disjoint, the total number of maximal chains is at most r(2 n + 1). Thus, since any maximal chain has size at most r, the total number of customers j not allocated the item i = arg max i u j,i − price i when u j,i − price i ≥ 0 is at most r 2 (2 n + 1).
Thus, the social welfare achieved by this allocation is at least sw(u j,· , price * ) − 2 n − 2 nCr   − 2 n ≥ (1 − 1/e) (OPT − C n − 2 n − 2 nCr) − 2 n, and the result follows.
